Brazil as a bridge between old and new powers?

One of the lines routinely taken by Brazilian officials engaged in international affairs is that their country is uniquely positioned to bridge chasms and build consensus in international affairs. Prosaic reasons for this abound ((1)). Culturally the country is diverse, claiming to have more people of Japanese descent than any country other than Japan, and more citizens of African ancestry than any country but Nigeria. Socio-economic realities in Brazil also capture the economic chasm of the North-South divide: the country exports advanced passenger aircraft and high fashion design while simultaneously grappling with tens of millions struggling to survive in poverty ((9)). Historical tradition and the exigencies of political and legal processes psychologically predispose Brazil to discussion and conciliation in search of an avenue ((19)) to any particular desired outcome. This translates on a formal level into a highly juridical culture with strong contending regional and political factions ((18)) that have to spend enormous amounts of time negotiating lest paralysis take hold ((2)). Brazilian diplomats have this in mind when they quip that they arrive at international discussions with the consensus position already outlined because the competing interests found in global talks have been reconciled during the formulation of their own national position ((13)).

Such a benign, conciliatory, consensus-creating persona for Brazilian diplomacy is only amplified ((4)) by the country’s economic and military insertion into South America and the global system. Brazil lacks a history of conquest or imperial domination ((3)). The country manifestly does not present a security threat to its neighbours, possessing little more armed might than the scant minimum necessary to vouchsafe ((5)) its own basic territorial integrity. It would thus seem that Brazil is ideally positioned to be the prototypical bridge-builder ((14)), working diligently to ensure ((6)) stability and predictability in the face of rising tensions between major powers as well as the North and the global South ((15)). This article contends ((7)) that while such an understanding has some merit, a simple view of Brazil as honest broker in global affairs overlooks the self-interested streak that lies at the core of Brazilian foreign policy and drives its attitudes to the development of international regimes and the conduct of global governance. In the theoretical terms set out in the introduction to this special issue of International Affairs, Brazil casts (8) itself as something of an integrative, value-creating negotiator ((30)) in the international arena. But when examined on a deeper level, the country bears more resemblance to a distributive, value- claiming actor ((12)). The ability of Brazilian diplomats to carry off this double identity rests in the country’s carefully constructed position as the intermediate or bridging ground between the South and the North ((10)).

In this context the role of bridge-builder offers Brazil three advantages that have only coincidental alignment with what existing powers would label good international citizenship: (a) controlling the flow of political and ideational interaction back and forth between the North and South; (b) exacting a ‘toll’ for traffic in each direction; (c) being indispensable to the international system because it is seen as the link between old and emerging powers.

To be completely clear, Brazil is simply doing too well economically and is too secure politically within the existing system to want any real change to the structure of the international system. The challenge that confronts Brazilian foreign policy architects is thus how to improve their country’s relative position within the international arena without engaging in behaviour that will fundamentally damage the system. Its key instrument in meeting this challenge is reframing debates and influencing others with ideas and allusions to future prospects, not hard power resources. While at times this means that there might appear to be a language of rebellion and substantive revision in Brazil’s foreign policy statements, even ostensibly isolationist ideas such as Lula’s new international economic geography are fundamentally predicated on maintenance of the existing global governance structures. The Brazilian aim is not to overturn these decision-making tables ((31)), but rather to gain an important seat with decision-influencing power ((32)) that will allow the advancement of its own interests while retarding initiatives it sees as inimical ((16)). In part, this fits with Brazil’s long-standing ambition ((33)) to be viewed and accepted as a major world power, captured in its perennial ambitions for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council and the fervent belief within Itamaraty that Brazil is the country of the future. On a more operational level, it fits with Brazil’s actual power projection capabilities, which are distinctly limited in economic, military and political terms. Maintenance of the existing international system is thus critical because Brazil has found a very cost-effective way of vouchsafing its sovereignty and autonomy through the strategic use and interpretation of international institutions, norms and regimes.

For the last 20 years Itamaraty has been working to position Brazil as a leader of first South America and then the global South ((29)). The sort of institutional machinations seen in the inter-American system and the UN form an important part of the foreign policy strategy of making Brazil the conduit for regional coordination and wider pan-southern interaction ((11)). Brazil’s approach is essentially one of coalition formation, aimed at compensating for its deficiencies in respect of hard power military and economic credentials with its ample ability to generate ideas that are operationalized through diplomatic flair and a capacity to mobilize or derail initiatives requiring a larger southern voice. On the applied front, this earns Brazil an invitation to major international decision-making tables such as the G20 and the UN. This in turn becomes important to the wider foreign policy priority of maintaining the pre-eminence of the international norm of sovereignty as a device for protecting national autonomy. What is different about the Brazilian sequencing is that its diplomats avoid tactics of simple opposition and blatant deadlocking, preferring instead to find technical routes that may deliver the same end by reworking accepted world- views or established causal patterns to create a new frame of reference for international negotiations and the participating actors.

Within this context, the project of constructing a role for Brazil as bridge between the North and the South is critical. It offers a way of positioning Brazil as an interlocutor that allows it effectively to exact a ‘toll’ on the bridge. Brazil’s consequent response to international negotiations is to advance its own interests behind a pan-southern value-creating, integrative fascia.

The remaining question is the extent to which these subtle turns and speed bumps will result in real changes in global governance frameworks and the international distribution of meaningful power and influence ((21)). Brazil’s preference is that they cause little alteration in the core rules and regimes ((20)), but perhaps a slight shift in norms that puts Brazil in a central position.

Although over-used, Brazilian musician Tom Jobim’s line that ‘Brazil is not for beginners’ ((34)) aptly applies to understanding how it addresses international issues, presenting a significant challenge for policy-makers in northern capitals used to a system focused on northern Atlantic issues. Assumptions about how Brazil will react to invitations to participate or approaches to consult on policy issues need to be rethought ((28)). The considerable diplomatic capacity found in Itamaraty is matched by an impressive ability to develop and communicate new ideas through a process of patient discussion and civil debate to create a consensus around something remarkably close to Brazil’s view. This approach to international issues ((23)) differs markedly from that found in traditional powers in the North, which have a reputation for often using a blunt stick and a very small carrot to gain consent ((22)). The interesting point is that this may present more of an opportunity than a threat ((35)) for the policy agendas of the traditional powers. Brazil’s core interests and ambitions ((25)) align remarkably well with those of other major powers ((24)); and, moreover, pursuit of these interests has been undertaken ((17)) in a manner that has yet to raise hackles throughout the South. This makes Brazil a potentially valuable partner for the continued management of regional and global issues ((27)), but only if northern capitals are able to shift how they view Brazil and learn a new variation on their existing themes of global governance ((26)).

(Sean W. Burges)

(International Affairs 89: 3 (2013) 577-594. Adapted)

The text ‘Brazil as a bridge between old and new powers?’ has been extracted from a text published in the periodical International Affairs, issue $n^{\circ }$ 89. The issue, as stated by the editors in an introductory article, has been divided into two parts. Part one comprises case-studies of three rising powers — Brazil, India and China — while the articles in part two cover the various actors and entities that have reason and/or ability to attempt to manage the rise of new powers. (...) These multiple actors may be grouped into four categories...’

The following definitions were given in the introductory article for each of the categories:

1. This group comprises states and groupings of states that have acquired, over the past decades, the role of agenda- setters as Great Powers. They have exerted defining influence in shaping the rules and norms of global governance. Despite their relative decline (especially with reference to the rising powers), they still have enough power to act as gatekeepers to the inner sanctums of international regimes.

2. In this category are the countries that represent the proverbial grass that gets trampled when elephants fight. They often form the unfortunate terrain on which scrambles for power can occur, but are also occasionally able to exercise powerful leverage by providing the follower base that aspiring leaders seek, and legitimize claims to greater power by securing for those leaders the backing of large numbers.

3. As the shift in the balance of power that we see under way today is not occurring simply between states, this category includes businesses and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that have emerged as repositories and brokers of power, effectively harnessed by states at different levels of the hierarchy and harnessing them to serve their own causes in turn.

4. This category recognizes that most international organizations, regimes and networks are seldom ‘actors’ in their own right. But different organizations, networks and regimes, even when made up of similar memberships, show different degrees of adaptability and reform in response to the needs and demands posed by rising powers.

The sequence that matches the category with its definition is: